All the Shah′s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror

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Starting with chapter 4, the book improves a lot. He starts by telling the story of George Reynolds who managed to strike oil in Masjed-Suleiman for the first time in Iran and then he gives a good account of how the British Empire managed to gain oil-concessions from the Qajar dynasty and establish the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which owned the oil-fields of Iran and managed to remain a dominant force with the blessing of the British government. These sections are among the best in the book. Kinzer manages to give you a good outline of the British Imperial policies with regards to Iran and how their obstinacy to fairly share their profits with Iranians and the ugly way they treated the workers of Abadan refinery, begot widespread resentment in the population. These grievances ultimately led to the nationalization movement which brought Mosaddeq to the pinnacle of power for the express purpose of nationalizing the oil. I really enjoyed that Kinzer doesn’t try to justify British policies at all and he manages to show them for what they were: naked exploitation of Iran’s oil. The fact that Iran probably wouldn’t have managed to extract its oil without their help doesn’t excuse their never-ending greed and their oblivious attitude to the suffering of Iranians. The Qajars thus sold effective power over Iran and its resources to the British. What eventually gave Mossadegh his primary goal in life, however, was the 1901 concession to London-based financier William Knox D'Arcy, granting him the "special and exclusive privilege to obtain, exploit, develop...and sell natural gas [and] petroleum...for a term of sixty years." All the Shah's Men is an entertaining and educating read. It sheds light on one of the most important U.S. actions in the Middle East of the 20th century. It is also a book with relevance to today. It is said that those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it. This book should be read thoughtfully by anyone concerned about where the current U.S. administration's policies might lead.

With breezy storytelling and diligent research, Kinzer has reconstructed the CIA's 1953 overthrow of the elected leader of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh, who was wildly popular at home for having nationalized his country's oil industry. The coup ushered in the long and brutal dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Shah, widely seen as a U.S. puppet and himself overthrown by the Islamic revolution of 1979. At its best this work reads like a spy novel, with code names and informants, midnight meetings with the monarch and a last-minute plot twist when the CIA's plan, called Operation Ajax, nearly goes awry. A veteran New York Times Same goes for Che Guevara, Simon Bolivar and everyone else whom popular history loves to celebrate as demi-gods. They are all human beings. Erm ... actually, worse: they were all men, and extremely self-absorbed and dominating ones). Kinzer's story is readable—in fact, at times it feels less than academic because its writing style is so simplistic. (Mr. Kinzer writes for the New York Times, and the style is reminiscent of that intended for a newspaper audience.) Because of the low writing level, the reading may be less than enjoyable—even if the material is nonetheless complete. Kinzer seems to claim that the CIA's actions in 1953 were the impetus for all later Middle Eastern terrorism, but this premise seems hard to justify. His contention that self-serving unilateral American action, in disregard for international law or territorial sovereignty, doesn't help American popularity one whit, is spot on, though. The story of the CIA in 1953 organizing a coup to overthrow a democratically elected leader in the Middle East, along with its negative effects on the region for decades, is a story that should be told many times. All the Shah's Men probably makes a good first telling of the tale. I'd like to see the publication of a more academic, annotated version, though. Notes Political instability arrived with the 20th century as the populace began agitating for a constitution, the nascent seeds of democracy. Three distinct segments within Iran wrestled for power: the Qajar ruling clan, the Constitutional reformers, and the Islamic clerics. Simultaneously, Britain and the Russian Empire tussled to maintain their economic interests in Iran and in 1907, they accordingly signed a treaty, notably without any input from Iran. As Russia became engulfed by its own civil war and revolution, Britain took decisive steps which resulted in its effective sovereignty over Iran. In the 1920s, Reza, an uneducated but ambitious military leader, toppled the Qajar dynasty and ruled until 1941. His successor was his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. Neither dislodged British business interests nor its military presence.As the author notes, Mossadegh was not a pragmatist. He was more of a visionary and utopian. Had he been a pragmatic leader, he could have made different decisions and avoided a crises that eventually led to his downfall. He could have agreed to mediation offered by President Truman who wanted to avoid a stalemate. The US and UK were at odds in the early 1950's. Truman did not support prolonging empires, called by Secretary of State Dean Acheson 'whiff of grapeshot diplomacy'. PM Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin delayed invasion, unable to secure US and UN approval. Once Churchill and Eisenhower were in power the tables turned. United under pro-capitalism and anti-communism they defeated Iranian aspirations, later ushering in the Islamic state. Kinzer tells the story well. An exciting narrative. [Kinzer] questions whether Americans are well served by interventions for regime change abroad, and he reminds us of the long history of Iranian resistance to great power interventions, as well as the unanticipated consequences of intervention." Kashani was not the leader of Fada'iyan, a fundamentalist malcontent named Navvab Safavi was the man at the helm. Navvab saw himself big enough to condemn “apostates” to death and authorized assassinations in the hope of purging the land of corruption. The clerical establishment didn’t endorse him and even banned him and his fanatics from Qom.) While being very curious about the erstwhile Persia, most of the available media-supplied images of Iran were couched in extreme anti-American rhetoric, nary a hint about why the people of that land might be so antagonistic. Kinzer fills in the gaps & does so in an almost politically neutral manner. As the saying has it, "the devil is in the details" and the way the story of the CIA-led overthrow of an elected Iranian government unfolds, seems almost comic at times, with anti-Mossadegh protestors being somewhat randomly hired by the CIA, at times reminding one of an early scene from the recent film Argo. What happened hardly represnts a distinguished moment in American diplomatic history.

This well-researched non-fiction book at times reads like a novel. The author did a good job documenting the coup of 1953 and the events, public and clandestine, that preceded it. First, the British tried to dismiss Mossadegh but failed. The Iranian government expelled many of the British agents from the country. Then the British decided to pass the baton to the Americans. Churchill aimed to convince the White House to take action. President Truman was against intervention in Iranian internal affairs.Following the 1941 Allied Invasion of Iran, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Shah, who upheld the oil agreement with APOC, which by then had been renamed the "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company".

After Mosaddeq nationalized the oil and the oil company, things came to a head. The British government didn’t want a deal without retaining (de facto if not de jure) control of the oil company and even though their position softened a bit overtime, their persistence was more than matched by that of Mosaddeq’s. Kinzer doesn’t criticize Mosaddeq openly but from early-on, he devotes paragraphs on his peculiar character that made him a great orator and a firebrand opposition leader but not a great statesman: “...[A] visionary rather than a pragmatist, preferring defeat in an honorable cause to what he considered shameful compromise.” This is actually a point of contention between historians: some believe that Mosaddeq made numerous mistakes in failing to make a compromise; others holding that the offers made by AIOC and the British government were not made in good faith and were not real attempts at a workable compromise. Kinzer doesn’t dwell on this and he settles for giving a broad summary of the proposals and then moves ahead.The only slightly negative thing I have to say about “All the Shah’s men” is the same that I had for “The brothers”: Kinzer is a passionate author, which is wonderful, but his political leanings tend to show - especially towards the end.

With his fast-paced narrative and deep ferreting out of the facts, Kinzer reassembles the CIA's 1953 coup of Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected leader of Iran in favor of the bloodthirsty dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Shah, who is believed to have been a puppet for the US government. i143243688 |b1080006496429 |dculnb |g- |m |h1 |x1 |t0 |i0 |j18 |k220701 |n02-13-2023 19:17 |o- |aDS318 |r.K49 2008 aIran |0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79039880 |xRelations |0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh00007590 |zUnited States. |0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78095330-781 In the fabled history of the coup, from such incapacity the CIA developed a resilient network that easily toppled a popular leader a few months later. The subject of this book is a coup aimed at overthrowing Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran. The author delves into the details of the coup and explores its ramifications that continue to be felt to this day.Enter, Kermit Roosevelt as CIA bureau chief in Iran and you have a chapter of history that now seems almost improbable in the recounting of many of its elements but which led to the overthrow of a elected government in Iran and the installation of the Shah, guaranteeing a friendly face & cheap oil but ultimately coming home to haunt the United States some 25 years later. As was later said in justifying the regime's radicalism by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was seen as much more humane following Ayatollah Khomeini, "We are not liberals like Allende & Mossedegh, whom the CIA can snuff out". After the Mongol conquest of 1220 the Safavid dynasty in 1501 established Iran as the center of Shia Islam. At the turn of the 17th century Abbas Shah combined modernization with tyranny, creating artistic marvels in Isfahan. In the mid-18th century Nadir Shah looted Delhi and lands around. The dissolute Qajars ascended to power during the 19th century selling off natural resources. Movements toward reform were delayed by a British-Russian partition in 1907. This book is about the 1953 British and American ouster of the democratic government of Iran and reinstatement of a despotic monarchy. It is also the story of PM Mossadegh, elected in 1951 and deposed in 1953. He was educated in Europe, Iran's first law PhD, a fighter for secular democracy and against foreign domination since 1905. From 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., called by Winston Churchill 'a prize beyond our wildest dreams' had been owned by Britain. Conveniently enough, the secretary of state could ask his brother to do the dirty work. Allen Dulles was then running the newly founded C.I.A., which had grown out of the wartime Office of Strategic Services. The C.I.A.'s man in Tehran was Kermit Roosevelt, an affable young O.S.S. veteran who had inherited his grandfather Theodore's taste for adventure. After masterminding the 1953 coup, Roosevelt began his victory speech by crowing, ''Friends, Persians, countrymen, lend me your ears!'' Kinzer’s brisk, vivid account is filled with beguiling details. . . . A helpful reminder of an oft–neglected piece of Middle Eastern history."